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Nosocomial Transmission
of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome: Better Quality
of Evidence Is Needed
To the Editor—We would like to com-
ment on the article by Yu et al. [1] re-
garding the risk factors for nosocomial
outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome that occurred in some hospital
wards and not in others. The authors per-
formed a retrospective case-control study
at the ward level and found that several
environmental or administrative factors
and host factors, such as oxygen therapy
or bilevel positive airway pressure venti-
lation, were associated with the occurrence
of these outbreaks. We wish to discuss the
study’s most important methodological
flaws, which may invalidate the results,
and to emphasize some points that should
be taken into consideration in future
studies.
First, the definition of a superspreading
event is questionable. The authors made
the strong assumption that the clustered
cases were all secondary to a single iden-
tified (or unknown) index case and that
transmissions occurred within the ward.
The assessment of the transmission chain
seems to be based solely on the timing of
events, although it is possible that all trans-
missions within a “superspreading” event
were neither nosocomial nor related to the
putative index case.
Second, the measure of the exposures
suffers from very important limitations.
Data collection was performed 1–3 years
after the events, leading to an important
recall bias. Some exposures were of eco-
logical nature (applying similarly to all pa-
tients in the ward at a given time), thus
making it impossible to be sure that a
given patient was really exposed to the risk
factor under consideration. Finally, some
exposures were measured during a 10-day
window period after the index patient’s
hospital admission (or the first case of the
cluster); consequently, some exposures
were measured after the transmission
event, violating the basic principle that the
risk factor needs to precede the disease.
Finally, it is possible that some wards
experienced 11 outbreak of infection or
that several patients with severe acute re-
spiratory syndrome were admitted, but the
authors failed to explain how they dealt
with this type of situation and the selection
procedure. Because transmission was
more intense at the beginning of the out-
break of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome, a selection bias may have played
a role, resulting in most of the case wards
being selected at the beginning of the out-
break and most of the control wards being
selected towards the end of the outbreak
and, therefore, jeopardizing any com-
parisons.
Study of this topic poses difficult chal-
lenges and relies on observational and ret-
rospective studies. However, interventions
to reduce infection risk are fundamental
to promote safety in the workplace, and
health policy makers face the difficult di-
lemma of balancing needs and available
resources. Although there is little doubt
that some procedures may increase trans-
mission [2], the risk associated with sev-
eral respiratory support techniques ob-
served in the study by Yu et al. [1], in
addition to the aforementioned limita-
tions, cannot be interpreted without in-
formation about individual compliance
with standard infection-control measures
and use of personal protective equipment
[3, 4]. Robust data are critical for policy
making, and sound recommendations re-
quire a better quality of evidence.
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